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Abstract 
This paper investigates Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of high-tech firms on the Chinese 
Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). Almost half of the high tech IPOs on the GEM are set up 
in pyramid structures. The likelihood of a pyramid structure increases with the size of the IPO 
firm and state control. Our results do not suggest that pyramids are set up to overcome 
financial constraints. However, we document that pyramid IPOs are discounted before the 
IPO. The price to book ratio estimated at the subscription price is significantly lower for 
pyramid IPOs compared to stand-alone IPOs. Furthermore, the underpricing is higher for 
pyramid IPOs. We conclude that IPO investors demand a higher risk-premium when investing 
in pyramid IPOs which translates into a lower subscription price and higher underpricing. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the causes and consequences of the decision to create a pyramid structure 
and separate cash flow rights from voting rights at Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). We 
document that pyramid firms are discounted already before the IPO, i.e. before majority 
shareholders could have expropriated any minority shareholders. Thus, the discount on 
pyramid firms documented by e.g. Claessens et al. (2002) appears to be driven, at least partly, 
by an ex ante risk-premium associated with investing in pyramids and not only by majority 
shareholders actually expropriating minority shareholders. 
Mechanisms that separate voting rights from cash flow rights, e.g. pyramid 
structures, dual class shares and cross-shareholdings, are widespread around the world and 
this is well documented (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1999). However, Adams and Ferreira (2008) 
point out that the empirical literature on the determinants and the effects of the actual decision 
to separate cash flow rights from voting rights is surprisingly small.  
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide a rationale for pyramidal ownership in 
family business groups. In their theoretical model a pyramid allows a family to use all 
retained earnings of a firm it controls to set up new firms. Furthermore, Masulis et al. (2011) 
argue that pyramids are used to alleviate financing constraints and lower the cost of raising 
external equity. The empirical literature on pyramid structures has, however, ignored the 
analysis of how pyramid structures initially were set up and instead focused on the 
performance and behavior of mature pyramid firms.1  Furthermore, the IPO literature has 
overlooked the effect of indirect ownership and pyramid structures on the IPO process.2 
By looking at the actual set-up of pyramid firms, i.e. the IPO, we shed light on 
the type of firms that become part of a pyramid. The original owners can choose between 
holding the controlling stake directly or through a pyramid structure. Based on Almeida and 
                                                          
1 For a survey of the literature on pyramids, see Morck et al. (2005). 
2 Some studies have analyzed IPOs by firms with dual class shares. See e.g. Taylor and Whittred (1998), 
Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001), Smart and Zutter (2003), and Holmén and Högfeldt (2004). 
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Wolfenzon's (2006) and Masulis et al. (2011) we derive hypotheses about capital constraints, 
firm size, and risk among pyramid IPO firms. We also derive hypotheses about the effect of 
pyramid structures on the IPO process based on the assumption that pyramid structures are 
associated with investor expectations about tunneling of corporate resources to the ultimate 
owner. If expected expropriation is discounted by external investors, they will only invest in 
pyramid structures if they receive an additional discount on pyramid IPOs.  
We use the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in Shenzhen as our 
laboratory. The GEM was launched in 2009 in order to facilitate for young growing firms to 
go public and raise external equity. Surprisingly, 46 percent of the high tech IPOs on the 
GEM during 2010 were set up in pyramid structures. In Europe, the typical pyramidal firm is 
a large, old firm in a mature industry (see e.g. Holmén and Högfeldt, 2009).  
Our sample consists of 173 IPOs on the GEM during 2010. We only find limited 
support for pyramid firms being capital constrained. The result indicating that pyramid firms 
have higher leverage is not robust in our sample. Furthermore, there are no indications that 
pyramid firms have higher capital expenditure. However, in line with Almeida and 
Wolfenzon’s (2006) argument, pyramidal IPOs are significantly larger than the stand-alone 
IPOs. We find no indications that pyramidal IPOs are riskier than the stand alone IPOs. 
Second, we investigate how pyramidal structures affect the IPO process. Using 
treatment effect models we document that the pre IPO (subscription) price to book ratio is 
significantly lower for pyramid IPOs. Furthermore, the underpricing, i.e. the price increase the 
first day of trading, is significantly higher for pyramid IPOs. These results are consistent with 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and Masulis et al. (2011). Minority shareholders demand 
compensation for expected expropriation which results in a larger discount on pyramidal 
IPOs.  
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Using detailed information about the IPO process we find evidence that the 
oversubscription rate among institutional investors is higher for the more underpriced pyramid 
IPOs. The oversubscription rate among individual investors is not significantly different for 
pyramidal IPOs. The results appear to be consistent with Rock’s (1986) model where 
informed investors only subscribe to underpriced IPOs. Even if the better informed 
institutional investors subscribe to all IPOs on GEM, their demand is higher for the more 
underpriced IPOs.  
This paper naturally relates to the literature on tunneling within Chinese 
pyramids on the main board (see e.g. Gao and Kling, 2008 and Cheung et al., 2009). 
However, we concentrate on the IPO process and do not investigate tunneling per se. Our 
results suggest that investors demand a higher risk premium when investing in pyramid 
structures on the GEM already at the IPO, i.e. before any tunneling could have taken place in 
the particular firm. Thus, the discount associated with pyramidal structures documented by 
e.g. Claessens et al. (2002) appears to be driven, at least partly, by an ex ante higher risk 
premium on pyramidal firms, and not by actual expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Our analysis of IPOs on the GEM is also related to Gao’s (2010) study of IPOs 
on China’s main board. Gao’s (2010) results suggest that underpricing is driven by 
overpricing of IPOs after listing and not by pre-market deliberate underpricing. Our results 
suggest that the additional underpricing of pyramid IPOs on the GEM might be related to a 
deliberate strategy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our 
hypotheses. Section three gives a brief overview of the new Growth Enterprise Market in 
China. Section four presents the data while the empirical results are reported in section five. 
Section six puts our results in perspective and concludes. 
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2. Hypotheses 
We explore the causes and consequences of pyramid structures at the IPO in 
light of Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and Masulis et al. (2011). Almeida and Wolfenzon 
(2006) argue that pyramid structures will be more prevalent among larger firms. The larger 
the firm is, the more difficult it is for a controlling shareholder with limited wealth to keep 
control of the firm without separating ownership and control. Furthermore, since dual class 
shares are not allowed in China, a pyramid structure is the natural choice for a controlling 
shareholder who wants to keep control of a large firm.  
Hypothesis 1: The pyramid IPO firms are larger than the stand alone firms. 
Masulis et al. (2011) argue that pyramids are used to alleviate financing 
constraints and lower the cost of raising external equity. Compared to direct funding, the 
pyramidal structure levers the internal capital under control which helps raise external funding 
for projects with large capital requirements and low initial cash flows. This argument is the 
basis for our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The pyramidal IPO firms are more financially constrained than the stand-alone 
IPO firms. 
In the empirical analysis we will use capital expenditures and leverage as proxies for capital 
constraints. 
 Masulis et al. (2011) also argue that families have incentives to place risky firms 
in a pyramid. By using a pyramid structure the families can leverage their invested capital and 
control many firms but at the same time minimize the risk and this argument is particularly 
valid for risky firms. Similar arguments can be found in Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and 
Attig et al. (2004). 
Hypothesis 3: The pyramidal IPO firms are more risky than the stand-alone IPO firms. 
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Almeida and Wolfenzon's (2006) pyramiding model combines the idea that the 
levered control over the firm's cash flow creates a financial advantage with the key 
assumption that tunneling of corporate resources is significant when protection of minority 
shareholders is weak. 3 The controlling owner use the capital of an already existing firm 
together with new equity capital from external investors to finance a new firm that they also 
control at the pyramid level below. If the new external investors rationally anticipate the cost 
of expropriation they will only co-invest alongside the controlling shareholders in pyramid 
structures if they receive an additional discount when investing in pyramidal IPO firms.4 
These arguments are the basis for our fourth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The subscription price to book ratio is lower for pyramid firms compared to 
stand alone firms. 
If the subscription price on pyramid IPOs is set low deliberately in order to 
attract investors it will lead to an expected larger initial returns, i.e. larger underpricing. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) also argue that the expected initial return is an increasing function of 
the uncertainty investors feel about the market price of the IPO firm after listing. Thus, if a 
pyramid structure increases the uncertainty investors feel about the IPO firm, it will translate 
into larger underpricing. 
Hypothesis 5: The underpricing of pyramid IPO firms is higher than for stand-
alone IPO firms. 
3. The Shenzhen Growth Enterprise Market 
The Shenzhen Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) is an independent exchange market with the 
purpose to create a good platform for small-and-medium sized high-tech companies to raise 
                                                          
3 Several recent papers find evidence of tunneling in Chinese listed firms from different perspectives. See e.g. 
Gao and Kling (2008) and Cheung et al. (2009). China is also perceived as a country with poor investor 
protection, for example, according to a corporate governance rating research conducted by Governance Metrics 
International (GMI) in 2009, China only got 3.01 (where 10 is the highest score) and belonged to the lowest 
ranked countries. Ireland ranked highest (7.44) followed by the UK (7.36), Canada (7.35), Australia (7.32) and 
the U.S. (7.18). 
4 Due to private benefits of control, the new firm has positive present value for the controlling owner even if the 
subscription price is discounted at the IPO. 
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equity funding. There are several differences between GEM and the Chinese main board 
market. For example, listing requirements, trading methods and regulations are different on 
the GEM. GEM encourages innovation-oriented enterprises, especially those with 
independent innovations, industrialization of agriculture, and regional characteristics to go 
public.  
In order to protect investors, the Shenzhen GEM is highly regulated. For 
example, a firm listed on GEM must disclose a transaction with an absolute amount over 5 
million Yuan or if it reaches 10% of the company’s total revenue of the latest audited fiscal 
year. Moreover, the ultimate owners cannot sell or repurchase their shares for a period of 
three years from the date of listing. 
Compared to growth markets in most other countries, the Shenzhen GEM also 
has the following features: i) a more stringent “net profit” requirement, i.e., the firm has to be 
profitable for the latest two years and the net income is at least 10 million Yuan, ii) higher 
requirement on firm size, net asset must be at least 20 million, iii) there shall be no 
accumulated losses in firms before listing, and iv) venture firms in seed stage are not eligible 
to list on the Shenzhen GEM (Source: website of Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
Shenzhen GEM is rapidly developing. New firms are listed almost every month. 
For instance, at the end of 2009 there were only 36 listed firms and in August 2013 the 
number has increased to 355. However, the Shenzhen GEM is still a small market in term of 
size. At the end of July 2013, the total market value of firms listed in Shenzhen GEM is 
1,306,178 million of Chinese Yuan, which is only about 16.3% or 9.1% of the market value of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange or Shanghai Stock Exchange, respectively. 
4. Data 
4.1 Sample and data sources 
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Our sample consists of 173 firms that were listed on the GEM in 2009 and 2010. These firms 
are typically young and in high-tech sectors. No financial or utility firms exist in the sample.  
Starting in 2001, publicly traded firms in China have to report the detailed 
ownership information in their annual reports. The information includes a figure of the 
ownership structure of the firm, the name and status of the ultimate controlling owner as well 
as the other nine biggest shareholders for both tradable and non-tradable shares. This 
regulation makes it possible to identify the ultimate owner and the pyramidal chain if it is 
applicable. For a detailed example of a pyramidal structure on the Chinese growth enterprise 
market, see Appendix.  
Since the largest shareholders of the firms are not allowed to sell their shares or 
buyback shares for at least three years after IPO, to date, there is no change in controlling 
shareholders in the sample. In addition to the manually collected ownership structure, we 
collect the financial data from Thomson Reuter, IPO data from RESSET (www.resset.cn) and 
industry classification is from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) Industry 
Classification.  
4.2 The IPO process on Growth Enterprise Market 
To date, the type of the investment banking contract in the IPO process on GEM is a standby 
commitment, with which the issuing firm and its underwriter first issue a preliminary 
prospectus and solicit interests from potential investors. 5  After approval from the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the issuing firm and its underwriter hold a 
pricing meeting where the offer price and the number of shares to be sold are agreed upon, 
and finally they reach the stage of the share issuance. Unlike other markets, the share issuance 
in GEM involves both on-line issuance and off-line issuance. The on-line issuance is mainly 
for individual investors. The procedure is, once an individual investor applies for a certain 
                                                          
5 All firms in our sample have a Chinese investment bank as lead underwriter. 
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amount of shares, he or she receives a “lottery number”. After the issuance of on-line shares, 
the firm announces the numbers that win the “lottery”, and only investors with those numbers 
can actually get a certain amount of shares. The number of shares is usually much smaller 
than the amount that the investor applied for beforehand. And for those who do not win the 
lottery, the money is to be returned. 
The off-line issuance is mainly aimed for institutions, and it basically follows 
the same rule as the on-line issuance. Since the number of institutions is much smaller than 
the number of individual investors, usually all of the eligible institutions can get a certain 
amount of shares of the IPO. The actual number of shares that each institution is able to 
acquire depends on the number the institutions that applied during the off-line issuance. 
Under a standby commitment contract, the underwriter is responsible for buying any 
remaining shares that are not subscribed in the two- to four- week standby period.  
In China, non-voting shares or other devices for discriminating against different 
shareholders are not permitted. B-shares or H-shares carry the same voting rights as A-
shares.6 Firms in GEM are too small to issue B-shares or H-shares. We also find that two 
ratios are fixed. The portion of a firm sold at the IPO is fixed at 25% and the tradable shares 
sold to individual investors (i.e., online issuance) are fixed as four times that sold to 
institutions (i.e., offline issuance). These fixed ratios reflect the strict regulation features of 
GEM. In order to protect the investors, especially the minority shareholders, the owners can 
only sell a moderate portion of their firms at the IPO, i.e., 25%, and 80% of the tradable 
shares have to be sold to individual investors.  
4.3 Sample, variables and summary statistics 
                                                          
6 A and B shares are the most commonly traded shares in China, and H shares (also known as Hang Seng China 
Enterprises Index) are mainly traded in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. A-shares are traded and denominated 
by Chinese Yuan, but B-shares are traded and denominated by US dollars in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Hong Kong dollars in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. H-shares are denominated and traded in Hong Kong 
dollars. 
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We categorize the IPOs on GEM during 2010 into three groups with respect to 
the characteristics of the ultimate owners, i.e. family-owned, state-owned and widely held. In 
our sample 156 firms are family controlled7, 11 firms are state controlled, and only 6 firms 
are widely held. Since the widely held firms do not have a controlling shareholder they can by 
definition not be set up in a pyramid structure and these 6 firms are not included in our tests of 
the probability of a pyramid structure. 8 . Thus, our tests of the probability of a pyramid 
structure use 167 firms. State owned firms only make up 7 percent of our sample. In 
comparison, Fan et al. (2005) find that in 2001, the government was the ultimate owner of 
about 76% of Chinese publicly listed firms.  This difference reflects that the Chinese 
government has encouraged more private corporations to list their shares publicly during the 
latest ten years.  
The main variable of interest and dependent variables in the probit regressions is 
Pyramid. It is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is set up in a pyramidal 
structure and zero otherwise. 73 IPO firms (43.7%) are set up in a pyramid structure. 
In the treatment effect regressions we use four different dependent variables. 
The first is the (subscription) price to book ratio pre IPO. PBpreIPO is calculated as the 
offering price divided by net asset value per share (NAP) before IPO. The second is the 
underpricing of the IPO. IPO underpricing rate is calculated as (Pc-Po)/ Po where Pc is first 
day closing price and Po is offering price.  
The third and fourth dependent variables are the online and offline, respectively, 
oversubscription rates. The oversubscription online (offline) is defined as the number of 
shares individual (institutional) investors have applied for, divided by the number of shares 
available for sale to individual (institutional) investors.  
                                                          
7 In line with Masulis et al. (2011), a firm where a family (this includes siblings, relatives, etc) or an individual is 
the largest ultimate shareholder is defined as family controlled. 
8 Since we use treatment effect models, where the probability of a pyramid structure is estimated in the first step, 
to estimate the effect of pyramid structures, the widely held firms drop out of these estimations as well. 
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Table 1 panel A provides summary statistics for the dependent variables. The 
numbers of Oversubscription online/offline as well as the IPO underpricing rate imply a very 
strong interest among investors toward the IPO firms on GEM. The average Oversubscription 
online (offline) is 149 (60), which is about 8 (3) times compared to that of IPOs in UK 
(Brennan and Franks, 1997). Furthermore, the average underpricing level is 0.463 which is 
higher than in most other markets (see e.g. Loughran et al., 1994).9  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
Our control variables include: Sales denotes the total sales of the firm in 2010 in 
logarithmic form and is used as a proxy for firm size. As an alternative size measure we use 
the number of employees in the firm (EMPL). Leverage is calculated as the firm’s total debt 
divided by total asset in the year of 2010. CAPEX stands for the capital expenditures related to 
property plant and equipment and is used to proxy for the firm’s investment. Leverage and 
CAPEX are used as proxies form capital constraints. We use yearly stock market volatility 
(Volatility) as proxy for risk.10 It is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
from February 2011 to September 2011 of each firm and multiplied by the square root of 252 
in order to have an estimate of yearly volatility.11 As a proxy for the firm’s growth potential 
we construct a Salesgrowth variable. It is estimated as the total sales in 2010 divided by total 
sales in 2009 minus one. In order to control for the effect of state ownership, we construct a 
dummy named State which takes the value of one if the ultimate controller is the state, and 
zero otherwise. Similar control variables are used in earlier studies on pyramids, e.g. Masulis 
et al.’s (2011) international study, Fan et al.’s (2005) Chinese study and Attig et al.’s (2004) 
Canadian study.  
                                                          
9 However, the average underpricing rate in our sample is lower than in Gao’s (2010) sample (on average 1.57) 
which covers 217 IPOs from 2006 to 2008. 
10 Ex-post IPO stock market volatility has been used as a proxy for IPO risk by e.g. Gompers (1996) and Zhu 
(2009). 
11 There are typically 252 trading days during a year. Because firms listed on the GEM randomly across the year, 
we choose the window in order to have all stock prices available for our sample. 
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Descriptive statistics for the control variables are reported in Table 1 panel B. 
The median IPO firm is growing rapidly and has relatively little debt. Median Salesgrowth is 
0.310, median CAPEX is 6.01, and median Leverage is 12.527%.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Univariate comparison of pyramid, non-pyramid and widely-held firm characteristics 
Table 2 reports the median difference tests for the firm characteristics of pyramid firms, non-
pyramid firms and widely-held firms. The significance level of the difference in median is 
based on Wilcoxon ranksum test.12  
We first compare the pyramid firms to the closely held non-pyramidal firms. 
The Wilcoxon ranksum tests suggest some significant differences. Pyramidal firms i) are 
larger (Sales and number of employees (EMPL)), ii) invest more (CAPEX), iii) have higher 
Leverage, and iv) have higher Salesgrowth than non-pyramidal firms. We find no significant 
difference in terms of the other variables.  
Second we compare the widely held firms to the closely held pyramid and non-
pyramidal firms. Widely-held firms have significantly higher capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
than closely held firms.  These are no significant differences between widely-held firms and 
closely held firms in other firm characteristics. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
5.2. Causes of pyramids 
We first estimate a probit regression to analyze what factors that influence the ultimate 
owners' endogenous decision to set up the IPO firm in the pyramid structure or not. The 
dependent variable is the pyramid dummy, which equals one if the IPO firm is part of a 
pyramid structure, and zero otherwise.  
                                                          
12 T-tests on mean differences generate similar results. 
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 Our first hypothesis is that larger firms are more likely to be set up in a pyramid 
structure. We use Sales or EMPL as proxies for firm size. Our second hypothesis is that 
pyramidal firms are capital constrained. We therefore include capital expenditure over 
property plant and equipment (CAPEX) and the ratio of total debt over total asset (Leverage) 
as independent variables in the regressions. Finally, our third hypothesis states that pyramidal 
firms are more risky and we therefore include our proxy for firm risk, stock market volatility 
after listing (Volatility), as an independent variable. 
To control for growth opportunities we include Salesgrowth. In China, state-
owned companies (SOEs) still dominate the economy, so we include a State dummy to 
capture the potential governmental effect. In some estimated models we also include 16 
industry dummies based on the industry classification by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). Thus, we estimate the following probit regression. 
i
j
jji
iiiiii
IndustryState
hSalesgrowtVolatilityLeverageCAPEXSizePyramid
egβ
βββββa
∑
=
+++
++++++=
16
1
6
54321
 
 The results are reported in table 3. In line with our first hypothesis, Sales and 
EMPL are positive and significant in most of the estimated models indicating that larger size 
increases the likelihood that a firm will be set up in the pyramidal structure. The result that 
pyramid firms are larger in size is supported by the theoretical arguments in Almeida and 
Wolfenzon (2006) and can also be found by Attig et al. (2004) and Masulis et al. (2011). 
 We do not find any support for our second hypothesis stating that pyramidal 
firms are capital constrained. CAPEX and Leverage are insignificant in all estimated models. 
Thus, while CAPEX has been found to significantly increase the likelihood of pyramid 
structures on the Chinese main market (Fan et al., 2005), in Canada (Attig et al., 2004), and in 
multiple countries (Masulis et al., 2011), it does not appear to be significant on GEM. One 
possible explanation is that almost all firms on the GEM are rapidly growing high-tech firms. 
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They are all investing intensively and it might be difficult to document a difference between 
pyramidal firms and stand-alone firms even if differences exist. 
Earlier results concerning the relation between leverage and the likelihood of 
pyramid structures are mixed. Masulis et al. (2011) find that leverage is negatively related to 
the likelihood of pyramids. Attig et al. (2004), on the other hand, find no significant relation 
between leverage and the likelihood of pyramid structures. 
Similarly, we find no support for our third hypothesis that pyramidal firms are 
riskier.13 Earlier results concerning the relation between firm risk and the likelihood of 
pyramid structures are mixed. Masulis et al. (2011) find that risk is positively related to the 
pyramid layer. Attig et al. (2004), on the other hand, find no significant relations between risk 
and the likelihood of pyramid structures. 
State is positively significant and this finding is supported by the 
decentralization theory by Fan et al. (2005). They argue that the government cannot relinquish 
control by selling off its stake in the firm freely due to strict regulation prohibiting the dilution 
of state ownership. Therefore, a pyramid can serve as a device for the government to 
decentralize control rights to the firm managers. Salesgrowth is mainly insignificant in table 
3. It is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in one of the estimated models.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5.3 Treatment effect models 
In this section we analyze whether and how the decision to set up IPO firms in pyramid 
structures affects the investors’ interest and valuation in the IPO. Endogeneity concern is an 
important issue in studies of corporate and investor behavior, respectively, and ownership 
structure (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In order to control for the fact that original owners’ 
endogenous decide whether to set up the firm in a pyramid structure we estimate treatment 
                                                          
13 In fact, Volatility is negative and significant at the 10 percent level in one of the estimated models. 
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effect models. Treatment effect models consider the effect of an endogenously chosen binary 
treatment--the pyramid dummy--on another endogenous continuous variable, conditional on 
two sets of independent variables. Related papers, for example, Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
and Masulis et al. (2011) also apply treatment effect models. The treatment effect model 
consists of two steps. The first step is a probit model with the binary treatment variable (i.e., 
the Pyramid dummy) as the dependent variable, and instrument(s) as independent variable(s). 
The second step is a regression of the continuous dependent variable, y, on the Pyramid 
dummy controlling for Salesgrowth, firm risk (Volatility), State ownership, firm size (Sales), 
and industry effects.14 Thus, we estimate 
i
j
jiiiiiii IndustrySalesStateVolatilityhSalesgrowtPyramidy egβββββa ∑
=
+++++++=
16
1
54321
 
where yi represents i) the pre IPO Price to book ratio (PBPreIPO), ii) Underpricing, iii) 
Oversubscription online, and Oversubscription offline, respectively.  
In the first step we use EMPL as our instrument variable since i) Almeida and 
Wolfenzon’s (2006) theoretical model suggests that pyramidal firms are large, ii) in our 
sample, pyramidal firms are indeed larger in size and have more employees than stand-alone 
firms, iii) EMPL is orthogonal (unrelated) to all the dependent variables in the second step 
(see table 4). 15  Our other size measure, Sales turned out to be highly correlated with 
oversubscription rates.16 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                          
14 The fraction of the firm floated at the IPO has been shown to affect underpricing (see e.g. Brennan and Franks, 
1997 and Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001). However, on GEM the fraction sold is fixed at 25% for all firms and can 
therefore not be used in cross-sectional analysis. 
15 A valid instrument in the treatment effect model should be significant related to the binary variable (pyramid 
dummy) in the first step, and be orthogonal (unrelated) to the dependent variables (PBpreIPO, Underpricing, 
Oversubscription rate) in the second step.  
16 Himmelberg et al. (1999), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Masulis et al. (2011) employ idiosyncratic risk as 
their instrument for ownership structure, e.g. pyramid structures in the first step. We tried the idiosyncratic risk 
from the single factor model and it turned out to be highly correlated with Underpricing. Furthermore, the other 
significant variable in the probit models reported in table 3, the State dummy, is also significantly related to 
Underpricing and therefore not a valid instrument. 
15 
 
In the first step, the treatment Pyramidi is modeled as the outcome of an 
unobserved latent variable, Pyramidi*.  


 >
=
otherwise
Pyramidif
Pyramid ii ,0
0*,1
 
All models are estimated with Maximum Likelihood and reported with heteroskedasticity 
corrected standard errors in parenthesis (White, 1980).17 
5.3.1 Subscription price to book ratio before IPO 
We start by testing our fourth hypothesis stating that the subscription price to book ratio is 
lower for pyramid firms. PBpreIPO is used as the dependent variable and it is calculated as 
the subscription (offering) price divided by net asset value per share (NAP) before IPO. Thus, 
it is an ex ante measure which should capture the underwriters' information about the 
investors' interest in the IPO.  A lower PBpreIPO, ceteris paribus, is consistent with investors 
using a higher discount rate when valuing the firm. Holmen and Högfeldt (2004) run similar 
tests on Swedish IPOs. 
 The results are reported in table 5 model 1. In line with hypothesis 4 we find that 
the coefficient on the pyramid dummy is negative and significant. The result suggests that 
underwriters anticipate that the investors will discount the price of pyramidal firms due to 
concerns of expropriation or asset appropriation. Wang (2013) finds that, other things being 
equal, pyramidal structures on GEM have a detrimental effect on firm performance, while 
Gao and Kling (2008) document that a firm belonging to a pyramidal business group will 
experience exacerbated asset appropriation on the Chinese main market. Among other 
variables, only Salesgrowth is significantly associated with a higher subscription price to book 
ratio pre IPO. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                          
17 Estimating the Treatment Effect models with the two-step Heckman procedure generate similar but somewhat 
statistically weaker results. 
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5.3.2 IPO underpricing 
We next test hypothesis 5 stating that underpricing of pyramid IPO firms is higher than for 
stand-alone IPO firms. The motivation for investors to take the potential additional risk 
associated with co-investing along with the controlling shareholder in a pyramid structured 
IPO might be that they are compensated by larger returns during the first days of stock listing, 
i.e. higher underpricing. The lower price to book ratio of pyramid IPOs suggests that this 
might be the case. The dependent variable is calculated as (Pc-Po)/Po where Pc is first day 
closing price and Po is offering (subscription) price. 
 The results are reported in table 5 model 2. In line with hypothesis 5, the 
coefficient on the Pyramid dummy is indeed positive and significant, suggesting that 
underpricing is more substantial for pyramid firms. We interpret this result from both the 
investors’ and the underwriters' points of views. First, from the investors’ side, this result is 
consistent with Beatty and Ritter (1986) who argue that the expected initial return is an 
increasing function of the uncertainty investors feel about the market clearing price of an IPO. 
Investors anticipate or seek more compensation when uncertainty is larger. For example, the 
uncertainty to invest in a relatively more complicated firm structure (pyramid firms) is larger 
than to invest in a relatively simpler structured firm (stand-alone firm). Second, from the 
underwriters’ point of view, a pyramid structure should increase the likelihood that investors 
might not be interested in the IPO and not subscribe to shares. Thus, in order to reduce the 
risk of not being able to sell all shares, the underwriters intentionally underprice pyramid 
IPOs more.18  
 In line with earlier research (e.g. Habib and Ljunqvist, 2001) larger IPOs in 
terms of total sales are associated with significantly lower underpricing. And in line with e.g. 
Gompers et al. (1996), more risky firms experience significantly higher underpricing. 
                                                          
18 As we noted above, the contract between the IPO firm and the investment bank is a standby commitment, with 
which the investment banker has to buy all remaining shares. 
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Furthermore, the coefficient over the State dummy is positive and significant. One 
interpretation of this result is that state-owned firms tend to underprice more in order to 
benefit investors, consistent with the “helping hand” hypothesis of central government as 
controlling shareholder. 19 Cheung et al. (2010) find that consistent with the helping hand 
hypothesis, central government connections benefit the minority shareholders of listed firms. 
In contrast, consistent with the “grabbing hand” hypothesis, the minority shareholders in 
firms controlled by the local government are expropriated as they lose up to half of the value 
of related party transactions.  
5.3.3 Online/Offline oversubscription rate 
We have shown above that pyramidal firms are discounted already before the IPO. 
Underwriters of firms in pyramids appear to be aware of the potential risk of not being able to 
sell all the shares and therefore intentionally underprice pyramid IPOs more. So do investors 
actually stay away from pyramid IPOs due to concerns of expropriation? Or do investors 
show higher interest in pyramid IPOs in order to obtain higher first day initial returns? We 
next examine if and how the pyramid structures affect the IPO subscription online and 
offline.20   
 We report the results in table 6 models 1 (online) and 2 (offline). The coefficient 
of the Pyramid dummy is insignificant in model 1 but significantly positive in model 2. Recall 
that online subscription is mainly for individual investors while offline subscription is mainly 
for institutional investors, and that a higher oversubscription rate implies a larger interest 
among investors.  
                                                          
19 9 out of 11 state-owned enterprises in our sample are controlled by the central government.  
20 Unlike the allocation rule proposed by London Stock Exchange where discrimination can only appear on the 
basis of the size of the applications (Brennan and Franks, 1997), CSRC allows for no discrimination against any 
investors (e.g., the size of application and identity) in the allocation process of the IPOs in Chinese firms. Firms 
and their investment bankers should notarize their lottery processes, so the allocation is on a fair basis, and this 
alleviates our concern about any potential selection bias of the successful subscribers. 
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 The results suggest that individual investors’ interest in IPOs appear not be 
affected by pyramid structures. Institutions, on the other hand, are keener on pyramid firms 
than standalone firms. Institutional investors’ larger demand for the more underpriced 
pyramid IPOs  appear to be in line with the general perception that institutional investors, 
compared to individual investors, have more experience, expertise, and better information.21 
On the one hand and in line with Rock’s (1986) theoretical model of underpricing of IPOs, 
informed investors (institutions) has an opportunity to profit from superior information by 
bidding for “mispriced” securities (pyramidal IPOs). They are compensated for their costly 
information processing about e.g. complicated pyramid structure, by larger first day returns.  
On the other hand, individual investors are usually regarded as less sophistication and they 
might have little knowledge about the pyramid structure. For example, Feng and Seasholes 
(2003) examine a sample of 90,478 actively investing individuals in China, and document that 
Chinese individual investors are much younger and have less investing/trading experiences 
than typical individual investors in U.S.  
 In addition, Volatility is positive and significant suggesting that investors regard 
IPO investments as lotteries with positively skewed returns. The likelihood that a particular 
IPO will be the next Apple increases with firm risk and therefore risk might increase investor 
interest.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5.4 Additional tests 
We have performed a battery of unreported robustness test. First, we have deleted the 11 state 
owned firms from all tests. Our main results remain unchanged. Second, we have included 
CAPEX and Leverage in the second step of treatment effect models. It does not alter our main 
                                                          
21 See Chakravarty (2001), Sias and Starks (1997), and Walther (1997).  
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results. Third, we include Return on Assets (ROA) in the models but it does not change our 
main results.  
 Furthermore, Masulis et al (2011) argue that pyramid structures might be used to 
overcome financial constraints. In the reported tests we have used CAPEX and Leverage to 
proxy for financial constraints. Another measure of financial constraints is of course dividend 
payments. Financial constrained firms should be less likely to pay dividends. However, we 
note that most firms in our sample are rapidly growing firms and most of them do not pay 
dividends, or pay very small dividends, irrespective of being within a pyramid structure or 
not. 
 Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that pyramids are set in order to derive 
private benefits of control and expropriate minority shareholders. Proxies for the value of the 
private benefits of control are difficult to construct using public information since they are by 
definition private (Zingales, 1998). The most commonly used measures, the voting premium 
on high voting stock and the premium at block transfer transactions, are not possible to 
construct for our sample since all firms are one share - one vote and no major ownership 
changes have taken place in the sample yet. However, we try to construct a measure by 
collecting the salaries paid by the IPO firms to the ultimate owners. Paying herself a very 
large salary could be one private benefits of control. We do not find any significant difference 
between pyramids firms and stand-alone IPOs in terms of the salaries paid to the ultimate 
owner.  
 The ultimate owner may of course place friends and relatives on well-paid 
executive positions in the (pyramidal) firms as well and this would be another type of private 
benefits of control. However, as far as we understand, this is very uncommon in China since it 
would generate an outcry among investors. 
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 We have also considered various interaction effects. For example, inspired by 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) and Attig et al. (2004), we have included the interaction effects of 
Pyramid and Salesgrowth, and Pyramid and Volatility in OLS regressions. The interaction 
terms are insignificant and the other results are not changed in a significant way. 
 Finally, we have replaced the pyramid dummy with the actual separation of 
control rights from cash flow rights created by the pyramid structure. This variable is not 
significant in similar tests as the ones reported above. Thus, it appears as if the pyramid 
structure has an indicator effect at the IPO, i.e. there is no linear relation between the actual 
degree of separation of control rights from cash flow rights and price to book, underpricing, 
and oversubscription. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion  
In this paper we have investigated Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of high-tech firms on the 
Chinese Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). As far as we know, this is the first paper that 
investigates the IPO process in combination with pyramidal structures on the new GEM in 
China. We first show that almost half of the high-tech IPOs on the GEM are set up in pyramid 
structures.  
Based on Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and Masulis et al (2011) we formulate 
five hypotheses and we find support for three of them. The likelihood of a pyramid structure 
increases with the size of the IPO firm (Hypothesis 1). The subscription price to book ratio is 
significantly lower for pyramid IPOs compared to stand-alone IPOs, i.e. pyramid IPOs are 
discounted before the IPO (Hypothesis 4). Furthermore, the underpricing is higher for 
pyramid IPOs (Hypothesis 5). We conclude that investors demand a higher risk-premium 
when investing in pyramid IPOs and this translates into a higher underpricing. Our results do 
not suggest pyramid IPOs are capital constrained (Hypothesis 2) or riskier (Hypothesis 3). 
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 We think our results contribute to the existing literature along at least two 
dimensions. First, most prior studies use information about mature pyramidal firms and 
document that at least under some conditions, pyramid structures are associated with lower 
firm value and worse firm performance (see e.g. Claessens et al., 2002, Lemmon and Lins, 
2003 and Fan et al. 2005). These results are often interpreted in terms of expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder. Our IPO results supplement these 
results and suggest that pyramid affiliated firms are discounted already at the IPO. 
 Second, we think our approach and the use of detailed information about the 
IPOs on GEM let us document a more complete picture than is typically done.22 The analysis 
of i) the price to book ratio at the subscription price, ii) the underpricing, and iii) 
oversubscription ratios also provides a consistent story. A higher underpricing could be due to 
a large interest in the IPO which creates overvaluation once the firm shares begin to trade. Or, 
a higher underpricing could be due to underwriters setting a lower subscription price in order 
to attract investors. Our results for pyramid IPOs on the GEM suggest that the second 
explanation is more plausible. 
 
  
                                                          
22 One exception is Gao (2010), who makes a detailed analysis of IPOs on the Chinese main board. 
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Table 1  
IPO characteristics of sample firms 
 
In this table we report summary statistics for our sample. The sample consists of  173 firms that listed 
on the growth enterprise market (GEM) in China in 2010. Accounting data and stock market data are 
collected from Thomson One and IPO data are from RESSET (www.resset.cn), industry classification 
is from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) Industry Classification, and ownership 
information is manually collected by the authors. The main variable of interest, Pyramid, is a binary 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm is in a pyramid structure and zero otherwise, there is no 
change in the ownership structure in our sample during 2010. PBpreIPO refers to (subscription) price 
to book ratio pre IPO, and is calculated as the offering price divided by net asset value per share 
(NAP) before IPO. IPO underpricing is equal to (Pc-Po)/Po, where Pc is first day closing price and Po is 
offering price. Oversubscription online (offline) is equal to the number of shares individual 
(institutional) investors have applied for, divided by the number of shares available for sale to 
individual (institutional) investors. State is a dummy variable equals to one if the ultimate owner is the 
state, and zero otherwise. Sales denotes the total sales in Chinese Yuan of the firm in 2010 in 
logarithmic form. EMPL stands for employee number, which is the logarithmic of total employee 
number of the firm. Volatility is equal to the yearly stock market volatility and it is estimated as the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns from February 2011 to September 2011 of each firm 
multiplied by the square root of 252. Salesgrowth is the growth of total sales in 2010. Leverage is 
equal to the firm’s total debt divided by total asset in the year of 2010, and it is in a percentage scale. 
CAPEX is equal to the capital expenditure over property plant and equipment.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics Dependent variables 
 25% 
percentile 
Median 75% 
percentile 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Pyramid 0  0  1 0.437 0.498 
PBpreIPO 9.189 11.455 14.444 12.456 5.094 
IPO underpricing 0.176 0.364 0.718 0.463 0.398 
Oversubscription 
online 
99 144 188 149 67 
Oversubscription 
offline 
37 58 79 60 33 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics Control variables 
 25% 
percentile 
Median 75% percentile Mean Standard 
deviation 
State 0 0 0 0.066 0.249 
Sales (in log) 3.420 3.827 4.270 3.882 0.674 
Volatility (%) 41.9 48.8 55.6 49.2 9.8 
Salesgrowth  0.142 0.310 0.480 0.337 0.355 
Leverage (%) 6.897 12.527 21.305 16.830 14.530 
EMPL (in log) 5.800 6.366 6.860 6.353 0.781 
CAPEX 2.950 6.010 11.960 9.798 11.439 
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Table 2 
Differences between pyramid firms, non-pyramid firms and widely-held firms, 
respectively 
 
In this table we report difference in median test between pyramid firms, non-pyramid firms and widely 
held firms. The sample consists of 173 firms that listed on the growth enterprise market (GEM) in 
China in 2010. Accounting data and stock market data are collected from Thomson One and IPO data 
are from RESSET (www.resset.cn), industry classification is from China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) Industry Classification, and ownership information is manually collected by the 
authors. PBpreIPO refers to (subscription) price to book ratio pre IPO, and is calculated as the offering 
price divided by net asset value per share (NAP) before IPO. IPO underpricing is equal to (Pc-Po)/Po, 
where Pc is first day closing price and Po is offering price. Oversubscription online (offline) is equal to 
the number of shares individual (institutional) investors have applied for, divided by the number of 
shares available for sale to individual (institutional) investors. Sales denotes the total sales in Chinese 
Yuan of the firm in 2010 in logarithmic form. EMPL stands for employee number, which is the 
logarithmic of total employee number of the firm. Volatility is equal to the yearly stock market 
volatility and it is estimated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns from February 2011 to 
September 2011 of each firm multiplied by the square root of 252. Salesgrowth is the growth of total 
sales in 2010. Leverage is equal to the firm’s total debt divided by total asset in the year of 2010, and 
it is in a percentage scale. CAPEX is equal to the capital expenditure over property plant and 
equipment. Median differences tested by means of Wilcoxon ranksum test. ***denotes significant at 
1% level. ** denotes significant at 5% level. *denotes significant at 10% level. 
 (1)With 
Pyramid 
(2)No 
Pyramid 
(3)Widely 
Held 
Wilcoxon ranksum test 
variable n=73 n=94 n=6 (1) and (2) (1) and (3) (2) and (3) 
 median median median 
PBpreIPO 11.390 11.500 13.946 -0.110 -2.556 -2.446 
IPO underpricing 0.346 0.397 0.261 -0.051 0.085 0.136 
Oversubscription 
online 
136 153 136 -17 0 17 
Oversubscription 
offline 
50.3 58.9 54.9 -8.7 -4.6 4.0 
Sales (in log) 4.065 3.566 3.970 0.499*** 0.095 -0.404 
EMPL (in log) 6.522 6.226 6.359 0.296*** 0.163 -0.133 
Volatility (%) 48.8 49.8 49.6 -1.0 -0.8 0.2 
Salesgrowth  0.336 0.278 0.270 0.058* 0.066 0.008 
Leverage 14.537 10.312 11.760 4.225** 2.777 -1.448 
CAPEX 8.070 4.800 11.050 3.270*** -2.980* -6.250*** 
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Table 3 
Probit regression, the dependent variable is the pyramid indicator variable 
 
In this table we use 167 closely held firms that listed on the growth enterprise market (GEM) in China 
in2010. Accounting data and stock market data are collected from Thomson One, and ownership 
information is manually collected by the authors. The dependent variable, Pyramid, is a binary 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm is in a pyramid structure and zero otherwise. EMPL 
stands for employee number, which is the logarithmic of total employee number of the firm. 
Salesgrowth is the growth of total sales in 2010. Volatility is equal to the yearly stock market volatility 
and it is estimated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns from February 2011 to September 
2011 of each firm multiplied by the square root of 252. State is a dummy variable equals to one if the 
ultimate owner is the state, and zero otherwise. Leverage is equal to the firm’s total debt divided by 
total asset in the year of 2010, and it is in a percentage scale. CAPEX is equal to the capital 
expenditure over property plant and equipment. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
***denotes significant at 1% level. ** denotes significant at 5% level. *denotes significant at 10% 
level. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Sales 0.603*** 
(0.216) 
0.552*** 
(0.194) 
- - 0.756*** 
(0.166) 
- 
EMPL - - 0.151 
(0.152) 
0.268* 
(0.145) 
- 0.377*** 
(0.138) 
Salesgrowth 0.356 
(0.353) 
0.348 
(0.322) 
0.588 
(0.392) 
0.605* 
(0.354) 
- - 
Volatility  -1.969 
(1.244) 
-1.331 
(1.08) 
-2.230* 
(1.229) 
-1.404 
(1.160) 
- - 
State 0.910* 
(0.472) 
1.087** 
(0.466) 
1.190*** 
(0.454) 
1.307** 
(0.468) 
- - 
Leverage  0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.0078) 
- - 
CAPEX 0.007 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.001) 
- - 
Constant -1.407 
(1.1) 
-2.030** 
(0.885) 
-0.164 
(1.209) 
-1.779  
(1.094) 
-3.100*** 
(0.651) 
-2.559*** 
(0.889) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes No Yes No No No 
Pseudo-R2 0.2348 0.1393 0.2057 0.1204 0.1009 0.0383 
N 167 167 167 167 167 167 
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Table 4 
Validity of instrument 
This table reports the results of the bivariate regression between dependent variables in the second step 
of treatment effect models and the instrument. The instrument is EMPL, which is the logarithmic of 
total employee number of the firm. Our dependent variables are: PBpreIPO refers to (subscription) 
price to book ratio pre IPO, and is calculated as the offering price divided by net asset value per share 
(NAP) before IPO. Underpricing, is equal to (Pc-Po)/Po, where Pc is first day closing price and Po is 
offering price. Oversubscription online (Oversubscription offline) is equal to the number of shares 
individual (institutional) investors have applied for, divided by the number of shares available for sale 
to individual (institutional) investors, note that both measures are in logarithmic form. Robust standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. 
 PBPreIPO Underpricing Oversub. online Oversub. offline 
EMPL -0.255 
(0.366) 
-0.034 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.051) 
0.065 
(0.065) 
R2 
p-value F 
N 
0.0016 
0.486 
167 
0.0045 
0.334 
167 
0.0018 
0.572 
167 
0.0053 
0.319 
167 
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Table 5 
Treatment effect models with the (subscription) price to book ratio pre IPO (PBpreIPO) 
and IPO underpricing, respectively, as dependent variables. 
 
In this table we use 167 closely held firms that listed on the growth enterprise market (GEM) in China 
in 2010. Accounting data and stock market data are collected from Thomson One and IPO data are 
from RESSET (www.resset.cn), industry classification is from China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) Industry Classification, and ownership information is manually collected by the 
authors. In M1, the dependent variable, PBpreIPO refers to (subscription) price to book ratio pre IPO, 
and is calculated as the offering price divided by net asset value per share (NAP) before IPO. In M2, 
the dependent variable, IPO underpricing, is equal to (Pc-Po)/Po, where Pc is first day closing price and 
Po is offering price. Sales denotes the total sales in Chinese Yuan of the firm in 2010 in logarithmic 
form. Salesgrowth is the growth of total sales in 2010. Volatility is equal to the yearly stock market 
volatility and it is estimated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns from February 2011 to 
September 2011 of each firm multiplied by the square root of 252. State is a dummy variable equals to 
one if the ultimate owner is the state, and zero otherwise. The endogenous binary variable, Pyramid, 
takes the value of one if the firm is in a pyramid structure and zero otherwise. The models are 
estimated by Maximum Likelihood, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***denotes 
significant at 1% level. ** denotes significant at 5% level. *denotes significant at 10% level. We use 
EMPL (employee number) as the instrument in the first step. In order to save space, only the results 
from the second step of treatment effect model are reported. 
 Model 1 
Second step 
PBpreIPO 
 Model 2 
Second step 
IPO underpricing 
Pyramid -8.265***  
(2.263) 
0.446** 
 (0.178) 
Salesgrowth 2.986**  
(1.262) 
-0.054  
(0.291) 
Volatility  -0.384  
(3.215) 
1.504***  
(0.291) 
State 1.814  
(1.677) 
0.371*** 
 (0.141) 
Sales 0.419 
(0.663) 
-0.081* 
 (0.046) 
Constant 15.872***  
(3.371) 
-0.093 
 (0.195) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
N 167 167 
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Table 6 
Treatment effect models with oversubscription rate online/offline as dependent variables 
In this table we use 167 closely held firms that listed on the growth enterprise market (GEM) in China 
in 2010. Accounting data and stock market data are collected from Thomson One and IPO data are 
from RESSET (www.resset.cn), industry classification is from China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) Industry Classification, and ownership information is manually collected by the 
authors. In M1 (M2), the dependent variable Oversubscription online (Oversubscription offline) is 
equal to the number of shares individual (institutional) investors have applied for, divided by the 
number of shares available for sale to individual (institutional) investors, note that both measures are 
in logarithmic form. Salesgrowth is the growth of total sales in 2010. Volatility is equal to the yearly 
stock market volatility and it is estimated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns from 
February 2011 to September 2011 of each firm multiplied by the square root of 252. State is a dummy 
variable equals to one if the ultimate owner is the state, and zero otherwise. The endogenous binary 
variable, Pyramid, takes the value of one if the firm is in a pyramid structure and zero otherwise. The 
models are estimated by Maximum Likelihood, and robust-standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***denotes significant at 1% level. ** denotes significant at 5% level. *denotes significant at 10% 
level. We use EMPL (employee number) as the instrument in the first step. In order to save space, only 
the results from the second step of treatment effect model are reported. 
 Model 1 
Second step 
Oversubscription online 
Model 2 
Second step 
Oversubscription offline 
Pyramid 0.085 
(0.259) 
1.033*** 
(0.161) 
Sales growth -0.196 
(0.148) 
-0.038 
(0.095) 
Volatility  1.722*** 
(0.439) 
3.058*** 
(0.360) 
State 0.116 
(0.147) 
0.595 
(0.183) 
Sales -0.103 
(0.072) 
-0.171* 
(0.095) 
Constant 4.192*** 
(0.375) 
2.588*** 
(0.503) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
167 N 167 
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Appendix: Examples of pyramid ownership on the Growth Enterprise Market23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Source: Wang (2013). One example of a pyramid structure on the Growth Enterprise Market is illustrated. The 
example shows how a (married) couple Zhou Qinzhi and Zhao Yilan controls Zhejiang Narada Power Source 
Company Limited through three intermediate companies-- Hangzhou Nandu, Shanghai Nandu Group and 
Shanghai Yidu. Zhou owns 60.53% of Hangzhou Nandu and 27.84% of Shanghai Nandu Group while Zhao 
owns 64.25% in Shanghai Yidu. Shanghai Yidu has a 56.67% stake in Shanghai Nandu Group which owns 
39.47% of Hangzhou Nandu. The weakest link in the control chain is 20.75%+8.16%+10.24%=39.15%. 
However, cash-flow ownership is more complicated since each chain has to be multiplied separately, i.e. 
((0.6053*0.2075+0.2784*0.0816+0.2784*0.3947*0.2075)+(0.6425*0.1024+0.6425*0.5667*0.0816+0.6425*0.5
667*0.3947*0.2075))*100%=29.64%. Thus, this company is ultimately controlled by Zhou and Zhao through a 
pyramidal holding. In this case, there is a 9.51% difference between the control rights and cash flow rights due to 
the existence of the pyramid. 
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